The Origins of the Directives of the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

15 Sept 1945

W. Keitel
Field Marshal a.d. (retired)

I. For the military operations in Austria, Czechoslovakia and furthermore in the campaign against Poland, the Fuehrer, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, gave his instructions, directives, and orders to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army directly and verbally, as practically only the Army, with a certain amount of support of the Air Force, participated or was employed. The High Command. of the Army (Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff) wished to confer with the Fuehrer directly ; "directives," which would be addressed to the Army alone, they rejected as unnecessary.

Proceedings in the Polish campaign were also similar in principle. The Army demanded the collaboration of the Air Force; the Navy received special orders verbally.

II. Only with the preparation for and commencement of the war in the west, in which the Navy and the Air Force were participating on a large scale, already before the beginning of the land operations, were the orders-together with the verbal instructions-of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, gradually carried out by directives and executed by the Supreme General Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW).

III. For the origin of such directives of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, 4 cases must be differentiated.

a. Case 1. For the preparation of military operations in the form of operational and deployment plans, and for the possible introduction and start of military measures concerning organization, war economy, and operations, the Fuehrer, as Supreme Commander, gave the orders on his own initiative and at his own discretion for further instructions, which were then issued in his "directives."

b. Case 2. During the course of military operations the "directives" were the result or effect of the daily situation reports, from which arose the necessity to intervene by orders or to issue new instructions for the carrying on of the operations of the branches of the Armed Forces and for their collaboration.

c. Case 3. The Commander-in-Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, on one or other of them, requested on his own account new instructions for himself or in connection with his cooperation with the others, which occurred more often with regard to the Navy and the Air Force.

d. Case 4. From the daily cooperation of the Supreme General Staff [Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab] with the General Staffs of the Army and the Air Forces as well as the Naval Command, there resulted obscurity, contrary interpretations, or other inconsistencies which had to be clarified or corrected by orders, that is, directives. If an understanding could not be reached by the Supreme General Staff, a decision or a "directive" by the Fuehrer was then necessary, as even the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces had no authority over the branches of the Armed Forces. IV.

In Case 1 the Fuehrer asked me as Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces to come to him with General Jodl (Chief of the Supreme General Staff). He (the Fuehrer) gave his interpretation of the situation according to present circumstances, and then gave the precise order to work out a "directive," which was then drawn up after repeated revision, correction, and, recasting wherever possible. The recasting was carried out by General Jodl.

Case 2. During operations in any theatre of war, reports regarding the military situation were given twice daily to the Fuehrer personally, once at noon up to the end of the preceding day, once late in the evening or early in the night regarding supplementary occurrences during the day. General Jodl, Chief of the Supreme General Staff, gave them situation reports. Only if the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces or their Chiefs of Staff, or Commanders-in-Chief of the fronts or theatres of war were present, did the Fuehrer, in most cases, ask for a report of their area.

From these daily reports of General Jodl resulted automatically the discussions between the Fuehrer and him regarding possible necessary interventions, amended, orders, instructions to the other branches of the Armed Forces (e. g. Air force) etc. From these discussions and the considerations resulting therefrom, arose naturally the neeessity for orders in the form of "directives." Then, after the situation report, General Jodl gave the instructions, verbally or by notices, to the Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff (Chef L) to work out a "Fuehrer-directive," if the Chef L (deputy of General Jodl) had not himself attended General Jodl's situation reports-as later arranged by me-and thus himself heard the wish of the Fuehrer.

Since the Fuehrer had himself also taken over the Chief Command of the Army on the Eastern Front, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army on the Eastern Front reported daily. Moreover, the situation reports, liaison, and connection with the branches of the Armed Forces and the theatres of war, the elaboration of all orders and directives of the Fuehrer, remained the task of the Chief of the Supreme General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Jodl. The Fuehrer discussed all, these questions of the conduct of the war with General Jodl direct, though almost without exception in my presence. When for any reason I was absent, not only Jodl but also the Fuehrer himself informed me concerning the orders he had given to General Jodl. If not forced to be absent on service duties, I was present at every situation report, and so was informed of the instructions and wishes of the Fuehrer. I participated rarely in the discussions unless requested by the Fuehrer; otherwise he did not wish me to express my opinion in this circle. When my opinion differed or when I wished to make suggestions, I went to the Fuehrer and talked to him alone, and exceptionally with Jodl.

Case 3. The Fuehrer decided during the situation report whether a "directive? should be drawn up or whether he wished to inform the respective officers commanding [Oberbefehlshaber] verbally himself.

Case 4. The chief W. F. St. (General Jodl) was informed verbally or by a written note regarding the matter. He then decided whether and in which form and in which direction a "directive" should be drawn up. He himself then reported to the Fuehrer regarding the "directive," explaining the reason for its origin, after I had been informed.

V. The "directives" were examined very critically by Hitler, not only the facts but also concerning style, and changed before he signed them, for corrections. In many cases I saw them only at the same time as the Fuehrer, or immediately before the report was made. Initialled them "K," so it was on file that I always knew of the "directives." I only suggested changes or different points of view before the Fuehrer had indicated to General Jodl his authoritative decision (my discussion alone with him) or when Hitler expressly' asked me. The Fuehrer wished to make the decision alone, he wished himself to lead and also to take the responsibility for the decisions.

[signed] Keitel