Why Comparisons with Concentration Camps Are Odious

André Lasserre *

Until 1939 refugees entering Switzerland had to prepare to leave the country again as fast as possible. They could move freely and lived on their means or from private support in the meantime. When war broke out, the frontiers closed everywhere, and it become ever more difficult to leave the country. Refugee funding sources dried up, and Jewish as well as gentile relief agencies collapsed under the financial pressure. At the request of these organizations, the Confederation in spring of 1940 opened the first labor camps. It became increasingly responsible for camp financing. From the "ultimate solution" of 1942 on (and the occupation of northern Italy a year later), the refugees increased in variety as well as number. The total occupation of France in November 1942 closed the last exit gate to the free world through Spain.

In June of 1942 9,600 refugees were counted; in December there were 26,200, in May of 1945 the record number reached 57,000, not to speak of the roughly 40,000 interned military refugees also staying in the country who were subject to different rules.

These dry figures say everything about the new phenomenon of asylum. It had become a mass phenomenon. All means taken to solve the reception problem were answerable to necessity: to meet the challenge of the great numbers. The labor camps formed the core of the problem, even if only a minority of the refugees was housed there. A statistic from April 1944 listed 25,174 refugees — 2,990 of them in quarantine and reception camps, 4,041 (16.1%) in labor camps, 5,206 in homes, 5,329 in hotels or with relatives, etc.

Upon arrival in Switzerland, the refugees had to be classified. First they were gathered in assembly camps near the border, then put in quarantine camps, and finally sent to reception camps where they awaited specific destinations. They depended on the Army and could fall into two groups: the first could still be rejected; the second, were granted a definitive stay and separated by gender, age, and health status. Everyday life in these camps was monotonous; the occupants were inactive most of the time. Comfort was minimal because the refugees’ stay was expected to be brief. Yet that was not necessarily the case because space had to be created first.

Men between age 16 and 60 who were able-bodied and healthy, were assigned to labor camps. Children were placed with families at age six. Women and frail males were housed in homes where they could perform light work. Those making use of their personal means or receiving aid from charitable organizations or family support had a chance to leave the camps and regain their independence. In this context a myth must be destroyed: not only Jewish organizations supported the refugees; nor did they have to finance the camps, as has been assumed incorrectly. The same conditions applied for all. All people falling under the category of wealthy refugees had to pay a special tax.

The camp principle and that of labor camps above all have assumed the center of current discussion. For financial reasons or due to monitoring, it was impossible to house refugees according to their desires. Enough apartments would probably not have been found for them. Comfort was in fact a rarity for men in the military barracks and in the homes set up in former hotels. One had to get used to the promiscuity and rules of community life. The unavoidable separation of family members was difficult to bear over the long term.

A great deal depended upon the camp supervisor: one proved to be tyrannical; another was indifferent to the physical or psychological problems of those entrusted to him. Yet there were also camp leaders who showed humane understanding for the problems of refugees traumatized by their past. The central leadership of the homes and camps — a private organization with a cadre lying under the aegis of the police — was fully conscious of the difficulties. It had problems recruiting qualified staff and had too little resources to ensure adequate inspection. By and large, the situation improved after the uncertainties of the start-up phrase.

In order to prevent the refugees from becoming totally demoralized, all of working age had to be employed. The Swiss population was also forced to make a great effort: mobilization permanently absorbed part of the pool of able-bodied males, while farming production had to be increased at the same time to compensate for the sharp reduction of food imports. A large part of the burden fell on women in the cities and even more on those in the countryside. The Swiss would never have permitted healthy refugees to have been supported as idlers without sharing in community tasks. On the other hand, neither would they have enjoyed seeing the refugees earning their living ... Reminders of the unemployment of the Depression years were still too vivid. The soldier discharged from the military would not have taken kindly to having his job occupied in the meantime by a refugee.

The only solution in this dilemma proved to be engaging the refugees in public work where domestic manpower was lacking: for instance, for roadbuilding, reclaiming farming zones, gaining peat as a coal replacement for heating and industrial purposes, etc. The central leadership sought contracts and organized their camps accordingly. However, mass logic again triumphed here: refugees had to carry out jobs which usually failed to correspond to their training, interest and physical abilities. For its part, the leadership was not embarrassed by poor justification: since refugees would have to leave the country after the war, this sort of work would most likely become available to them in the country to which they would migrate. The same applied for women who one encouraged to work privately as household employees!

In this system the police saw a further advantage: "The discipline demanded of the refugees in the camp and adaptation to community life can only be of use to them." This obsession with strictness fit entirely into the image the leadership had of Jews, Communists, or underground partisans. Many of these were found in the camps and also held in suspicion as tending toward disorder or anarchy.

Nonetheless, the simple life as well as the tough and monotonous work did not mean that the Swiss camps resembled concentration camps. Those who believe this obviously know nothing of either the local camps nor Hitler’s. It would be fitting to compare life in the camp with that of the population whose living standard was far lower than today’s.

The main difference between the concentration camps consists in the fact that our camps were open. Guests from outside included the clergy, public speakers, members of Parliament, theater troupes, or other cultural groups organized by the refugees. Camp residents could go out evenings themselves, and visit family from time to time. Moreover, the camps were not overseen by the military. The leadership wanted to limit contact with the outer world as much as possible. In this sense, one can speak of a camp world encapsuled in the country with its own laws. The dream of isolation was never fully realized. On the contrary, it became ever further removed.

Further differences from the concentration camps were pay (even if modest) for work performed, a right of recourse against decrees and illegal treatment which had developed over the course of years, an advancing dissolution of the communes, and the certainty that the war’s end would also mean the end of the camps.

The mass treatment followed the concept that all individuals are the same and thus all ought to lead similar lives and cope with the same tasks. Yet one had to deviate from this simplified vision even when moving refugees on after accepting them in the assembly camps. It became necessary to advance people according to their personal traits, and their physical abilities. Thus one avoided, for example, mixing practicing Jews subject to strict dietary rules with other people just as mixing German Jews with German citizens of other faiths. In the interest of internal camp balance, the creation of homogenous groups was imposed. Experience also soon showed that coexistence of Communists with non-Communists did not work well. Establishment of homogenous groups was imperative in order to ensure internal camp balance.

From 1943 on, the vision of an undifferentiated mass of refugees suffered further damage. An internal process occurred, first only timidly, then more clearly; it was sought by humanitarian organizations, and from 1943 on by an outside development: the victory of the Allies which announced the end of hostilities.

Within the framework of the leisure organization in which refugees themselves had seized the initiative, preparation of recent emigration assumed an ever greater role: leisure should also serve for activities other than preparing for heavy work and enable integration into normal society. Despite the resistance of some camp commandants and very paternalistic relief agencies, the specialities for integration and professional training were broadened little by little. Following the example of military internment camps, young refugees received access to colleges and universities. The right was even granted to women to be trained for professions other than household work ... What a change in the concept of refuge and refugees!

A veritable revolution crowned the movement: a meeting of refugee delegates at the end of February 1945 in Montreux. Above all the delegation often heatedly discussed the future of refugees. Remaining true to its collective tradition, the federal administration desired to assign the contingent for the future migration countries itself. The refugees wanted to decide for themselves. Many Jews dreamed of the USA, less of Palestine. Others wanted to return to their home countries. Finally they were granted the right to codetermine their own future. This was the last gift of a state which is so proud of its own democracy ...

The acceptance of refugees shows dark and brighter sides. Yet it is not tenable to compare the labor camps with concentration camps. The Swiss had to learn to accept in succession 295,000 civilian and military refugees — and that in war time, which one forgets all to easily. On the other hand, the refugees had to learn to live in the community under abnormal conditions. Traumatized and off-balance due to their experiences, many of them were difficult and made life difficult for the camp and home staff.

The basis for harmony and good terms was lacking. It had to be won first.

* André Lasserre: is a emeritus professor of history at the University of Lausanne.

Article published in The Bund (Berne) of January 22, 1998

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